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Recent Cases
AGENCY-RATIFICATION

Compton v. Vaugh.n1
Defendants appointed 0. L. Roberts and Company, a real estate firm, as their
sole agent for the sale of their residence property. The firm procured purchasers,
the plaintiffs, who entered into a contract with defendants on January 12, 1948,
whereby defendants were to sell the property to plaintiffs for $4000, of which $200
was to be paid upon the signing of the contract, $1800 upon the delivery of the
deed, and $2000 to be obtained by plaintiffs' procurance of a loan. The contract
acknowledged receipt of the $200, which, as is usual with earnest money in such
transactions, was deposited with the agent by check payable to the agent. At the
agent's request, plaintiffs paid the $1800, also by check payable to the agent, on the
next day, January 13. Plaintiffs' application for the loan was later rejected by a
loan company, and defendants were told by their agent that unless they, the defendants, carried the loan the "deal would fall through." On February 7, defendants
advised 0. L. Roberts and Company by letter that they would carry tie loan. On
February 18, 0. L. Roberts, of the firm of 0. L. Roberts and Company, absconded
and the firm was later adjudicated a bankrupt. The plaintiffs executed a note
dated February 19, 1948, and a deed of trust securing the note, complying with the
terms of the defendants' commitment in their letter of February 7. Upon plaintiffs'
tender of these instruments, defendants refused to convey except upon plaintiffs'
payment of the further sum of $1800. Plaintiffs brought this action for specific
performance of the contract, contending that the evidence showed that defendants
had ratified the action of their agent in receiving the $1800 payment. The trial
court entered a decree for plaintiffs, and defendants appealed. After holding that
the trial court was justified in finding that the defendants had Inowledge2 on or
before February 7 that plaintiffs had paid the additional sum of $1800 into the
hands of defendants' agent, the supreme court held that : "Having such knowledge,
defendants would naturally be expected to speak up, if they did not approve. They
did not protest or dissent or disaffirm or repudiate but acquiesced, and continued
in their recognition of 0. L. Roberts and Company as their agent, committing
themselves through the agent to carry the loan for the balance of the purchase
1. 222 S.W. 2d 81 (Mo. 1949).
2. "As a general rule, in order that a ratification of an unauthorized act or
transaction of an agent may be valid and binding, it is essential that the principal
have full knowledge, at the time of the ratification, of all material facts and circumstances relative to the unauthorized act or transaction, or that some one authorized to represent the principal, except the agent, have such knowledge, unless
the principal is wilfully ignorant or purposely refrains from seeking information."
2 C. J. Agency § 93. "If, at the time of affirmance, the purported principal is ignorant of material facts involved in the original transaction, he may elect to avoid
the effect of the affirmance, unless he then manfests a willingness to affirm regardless of the incompleteness of his knowledge." RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 91 (1933).
(178)
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price. It was reasonable to infer in such circumstances that the payment to the
agent was agreeable to defendants, and to find that they ratified the act of their
agent in receiving the $1800 payment."
Since a real estate agent's mere power to sell realty does not give such agent
3
the authority to receive payment of the purchase money, the decisive issue, as
the court stated, is whether the defendants ratified the action of their agent in receiving the $1800 payment.
Ratification is defined as "the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did
not bind him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the
'4
act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him."
An affirmance is "a manifestation of an election by the one on whose account an
unauthorized act has been performed to treat the act as authorized, or conduct by
him justifiable only if there is such an election." 5
Ratification may be expressed by spoken or written words, or it may be implied
from any acts, words, or course of conduct on the part of the principal which
reasonably tends to show an intention to ratify the unauthorized acts or transactions
of the alleged agent or are inconsistent with any other intenion.6 There were no
spoken or written words present in the principal case sufficient to constitute an
express ratification; therefore, the principal case is clearly an instance of implied
ratification if there is any ratification at all. The question is whether the particular
acts, words, or course of conduct on the part of the defendants is sufficient to constitute an affirmance and an implied ratification of the unauthorized transaction.
Silence or failure to repudiate is always evidence of ratification although the
weight of such evidence is dependent upon the accompanying facts and circumstances. 7 Such silence or failure to repudiate will often constitute the foundation
for an inference or presumption of ratification,8 but it is not conclusive evidence
of ratification in Missouri unless it is inexplicable on any other theory or unless
loss would otherwise fall on an innocent party.9
3. Stewart v. Wood, 63 Mo. 252 (1876).
4. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §82 (1933).
5. Id. § 83.
6. Larson v. Marcy, 61 Mont. 1, 201 Pac. 685 (1921); 2 AM. JUR. Agency §
225; 2 C. J. S. Agency § 47; and RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 93 (1933), which states
that except where certain formalities such as seal or writing are requisite for the
authorization of an act, an affirmance, and therefore a ratification, "may be established by any conduct of the purported principal manifesting that he consents
to be a party to the transaction, or by conduct justifiable only if there is ratification."
7. Larson v. Marcy, supra note 6; Price v. Peeples, 66 Okla. 139, 168 Pac.
191 (1917); Thompson v. Murphy, 60 W. Va. 42, 53 S.E. 908 (1906).
8. Birmingham News Co. v. Birmingham Printing Co., 209 Ala. 403, 96 So.
336 (1923); Baker v. Brown & Hackney, Inc., 144 Ark. 641, 215 S.W. 578 (1919);
Lynch v. Smith, 25 Colo. 103, 54 Pac. 634 (1898); First National Bank v. Fricke,
75 Mo. 178, 42 Am. Rep. 397 (1881); Bell-Wayland Co. v. Bank of Sugden, 95
Okla. 67, 218 Pac. 705 (1923); Price v. Peeples, .supranote 7.
9. St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. Wanamaker & Brown, 115 Mo. App.

270, 90 S.W. 737 (1905).
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That silence or failure to repudiate is evidence of ratification is in accord with
the principles of the Restatement of Agency to the effect that "An affirmance of
an unauthorized transaction may be inferred from a failure to repudiate it,"1° and
that "Silence under such circumstances that, according to the ordinary experience
and habits of men, one would naturally be expected to speak if he did not consent,
is evidence from which assent may be inferred."" L
Since the court held that "defendants would naturally be expected to speak
up, if they did not approve," the question arises whether the circumstances were
such that, according to the ordinary experience and habits of men, defendants
would naturally have been expected to speak if they did not consent. It seems that
such circumstances did exist In holding that defendants had knowledge of the
unauthorized receipt oF payment by their agent, the court must have accepted the
evidence, on or before February 7, telling them that $2000 had been paid by
plaintiffs, and also that plaintiff, Ella Compton, talked with the defendant, Roy
Vaughn, before February 7, and that she asked him if he knew his money was at
Mr. Roberts' and he replied that he did. Therefore, the court's holding that "defendants would naturally be expected to speak up, if they did not approve" seems
justified.
No precise rule can be stated as to the time within which the principal must
give notice of repudiation. It has been held that the principal should repudiate
the act promptly, immediately, at once, or as soon as informed or notified of the
act. Generally, however, it is held that the principal must repudiate the unauthor.
ized act of an agent within a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge of the
unauthorized transaction if he would avoid liability.12 What is deemed to be a
reasonable time depends upon the situation of the parties and the facts and circumstances of the case. The holding of the court that "defendants would naturally be
expected to speak up, if they did not approve" indicates that the court felt that
the period of time after defendants acquired knowledge of the payment (at least
12 days) was more than reasonable. In Ilgenfritz v. Missouri Pac. Ry.,13 on facts
very similar to the facts of the principal case, a time of four or five days was held
to be unreasonable and ratification of an unauthorized act was implied.
Ratification may be more readily implied where the unauthorized act is done
by an agent who abuses or exceeds his authority than where a stranger or volunteer
purports to act on behalf of the principal without any authority.14 The supreme
court pointed out that it was keeping in mind the rule that, "Where agency does
.10. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 94 (1933).
11. Id. Comment a.
12. Miller v. Chatsworth Say. Bank, 203 Iowa 411, 212 N.W. 722 (1927);
St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. Wanamaker & Brown, supra note 9; Price
v. Peeples, supra note 7; Foxworth v. Murchison Nat. Bank, 136 S.C. 458, 134 S.E.
428 (1926); 2 AM. JUR. Agency § 233.
13. 169 Mo. App. 652, 155 S.W. 854 (1913).
14. Birmingham News Co. v. Birmingham Printing Co., supra note 8; Lynch
v. Smith, supra note 8; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 94, Comment b (1933); 2 C. J. S.
Agency § 57.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950
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in fact exist but the agent acts in excess of his powers, the facts will be liberally
construed in favor of the ratification by the principal and very slight circumstances will often suffice to raise the presumption or justify the inference of ratification."- Under this rule, it is relatively easy to conclude that the period of
time in the principal case was unreasonable.
That unreasonable delay may be held to work an implied ratification of unauthorized acts is particularly true where the principal's delay in repudiation is
accompanied by any words or conduct indicating an approval or recognition of the
principal indicating that he recognizes or continues to recognize the person who
acted to be his agent is evidence tending to constitute a ratification of such agent's
acts. Such language and conduct is found in the principal case in the defendants'
continued recognition, with knowledge of the payment, of the firm as their agent by
committing themselves through the agent to carry the loan for the balance of the
purchase price. In Ilgenfritz v. Misouri Pac. Ry. 16 the court pointed out the continued recognition of the agent, holding that "no repudiation was made of the
agent's authority; on the contrary . . . defendant wrote to the agent of matters
which shows a continuation of his agency."
While there is no doubt that the continued recognition or retention of an
agent, with knowledge of the material facts of his unauthorized act, is evidence
of ratification, 17 it is clear that the weight of such evidence depends upon the accompanying circumstances. The inere retention or continued recognition of an
agent in the principal's employment after he has learned of the agent's unauthorized act will not amount to a ratification of such act.18 Therefore, considered separate and apart from the rest of the facts, defendants' continued recognition of the
firm as their agent by committing themselves through the agent to carry the loan
for the balance of the purchase price would not have been, in and of itself, sufficient
evidence on which to base a holding of ratification. However, considered in conjunction with the silence or failure to repudiate for an unreasonable time, it does
serve to support the finding of ratification.
The case presents evidence not only of mere silence or failure to repudiate but
of that fact coupled with conduct inconsistent with disapproval.19 The defendants
tacitly accepted the situation resulting from the unauthorized act of their agent
and acted upon it by continuing in their recognition of their agent.
15. Easton Food Center v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 119 S.W. 2d 987 (Mo.
App. 1938); Madison v. Williams, 16 S.W. 2d 626 (Mo. App. 1929); Cut Rate
Woolen Co. v. U. S. Tailoring Co., 267 S.W. 969 (Mo. App. 1925); Plummer v.
Knight, 156 Mo. App. 321, 137 S.W. 1019 (1911); Larson v. Marcy, supra note 6;
3 C. J. S. Agency § 319.
16. See note 13 supra.
17. Da Ponte v. Ogden, 161 La. 378, 108 So. 77 (1926); J. I. Case-Threshing
Mach. Co. v. Beavers, 261 S.W. 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
18. Edmunds v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 174 Cal. 246, 162 Pac. 1038 (1917),
in which the court said,"..... failure to discharge such agent may be evidence tending to show ratification, but the omission to dispense with the services of the
offender, standing by itself and unsupported by any other circumstances indicating
the employer's approval of his course, is never sufficient to establish ratification."
19. See 1 MEcHEm, THE LAw OF AGENCY § 471 (2d ed. 1914).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss2/4
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and by offering to carry the loan themselves. Also it is proper to consider that
the dissatisfaction of the defendants appears to' have been an afterthought upon
the happening of the unexpected insolvency of the agent 20 Under these circumstances, the court clearly reached the proper result in finding that defendants had
ratified the unauthorized act of their agent.
BUELL

BANKS

AND BANKING--WHAT

F.

WEATHERS

CoNsTITrrEs BANKING?

State, on Inf. of Taylor, Atty. Gen., v. Currency Services, Inc.'
Currency Services, Inc. was incorporated under the general business and manufacturing statutes of this state. A portion of its articles purported to authorize
it to buy and sell post-card checks and money orders and other business and financial forms. The check forms are printed on the reverse side of a postal card and
these forms are sold by the agents of Currency Services, Inc. The agents collect
the face value of the sum on the card which ranges in value from $1.00 to $100.00.
A small fee is collected in addition to the amount of the check and the agent is
allowed to retain 40 per cent of this fee. The agent remits to Currency Services
at stated times the face value of the check plus 60 per cent of the fee. These
checks are drawn by Currency Services on an account maintained by the drawer
in a private banking institution and no checks but these particular checks are drawn
on this account. Currency Services is under contract with the bank to maintain a
balance in the account of not less than $10,000.00 and furnish a bond to the bank
to provide against overdrafts. Customers, primarily those without their own checking accounts, buy the check post-cards in order to pay their bills. The checks also
are useful to those who do not wish to carry a large amount of cash.
The state based a quo warranto proceeding on Section 7890, Missouri Revised
Statutes (1939),2 and asked that the charter of the corporation be forfeited and
that the respondents be restrained from exercising the franchise and privileges of
banks and that a fine be assessed against each of the respondents. The special commissioner found that "the sale and issuance of the checks and money orders, and
on occasions the return of the purchaser's money, are the only acts that might

20. Waisner v. Hasbrouck, 34 Wyo. 61, 241 Pac. 703 (1925).
1. 218 S.W. 2d 600 (Mo. 1949).
2. "No corporation, domestic or foreign, other than a corporation formed
under or subject to the banking laws of this state or of the United States, except as
permitted by such laws, shall by any implication or construction be deemed to
possess the power of carrying on the business of discounting bills, notes or other
evidences of debt, or receiving deposits, of buying and selling bills of exchange, or
of issuing bills, notes or other evidences of debt for circulation as money, or of
engaging in any other form of banking; nor shall any such corporation, except an
express company having contracts with railroad companies, or a transatlantic
steamship company, or a telegraph or telephone company, possess the power of receiving money for transmission or transmitting the same, by draft, traveler's check,
money order or otherwise."

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1950], Art. 4

1950]

RECENT CASES

be considered bank practices." The court, denying the writ, held the practice of
selling checks not to be banking practice, distinguishing the selling of checks from
"buying and selling of bills of exchange." The court first distinguished between a
check and a bill of exchange 3 and secondly distinguished between "buying and
selling bills of exchange" and only selling bills of exchange. 4 This appears to be the
first time that the Supreme Court of Missouri has found it necessary to interpret
this statute. However, courts in other jurisdictions, confronted by similar problems,
have reached the same result as the Missouri court, using the same reasoning as that
used by the Missouri court.
When interpreting statutes of this type the courts have made diligent effort
to carry out the intention of the legislature and at the same time to escape unduly
harsh results which the wording of the statutes might suggest. 5 The purpose of such
statutes is to regulate those corporations which receive money on deposit and invest
such money for the benefit of the corporation.6 Thus it has been said that the
banking business is the receiving of money on deposit and the maintaining of a
place of business for that purpose.7 Courts have held that a corporation doing a
single act or engaging in only one or more types of activity usually engaged in by
banks is not necessarily engaged in the banking business.8 The courts have also
3. The court ]points out that the first part of § 7890 speaks of the business
of buying and selling bills of exchange while the last part of the transmission of
money by draft, traveler's check, money order, thus clearly recognizing a distinction between bills of exchange and drafts, checks and money orders.
Hays v. Lathrop Bank, 75 Mo. App. 211 (1898); 1 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING 853 (6th ed. 1928).
4. The court points out that Currency Services does not buy checks but only
sell their own personal checks drawn on a daily licensed bank.
5. Meserole Securities v. Cosman, 253 N. Y. 130, 170 N.E. 519 (1930).
("The powers conferred upon banks are, of course, banking powers when exercised
in a banking operation; they may be ordinary business powers when exercised in
connection with a business operation of other nature. Business corporations are
not authorized to exercise banking powers, but the legislative restrictions must be
read in their context and construed in their natural sense and may not by forced
construction be given an application broader than their purpose."), 4 ST. JOnN'S
L. REV. 289 (1930), 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 984 (1930), 39 YALE L. J. 127 (1929);
Fidelity Inv. Ass'n. v. Emerson, 318 Ill. 548, 149 N.E. 530 (1925); Businessmen's
Mortgage and Credit Corp. v. Dobjinsky, 133 Misc. 628, 238 N. Y. Supp. 158
(Mun. Ct. 1928); Seldon v. Equitable Trust, 94 U. S. 419 (1876); I MORSE, BANKS
AND BANKING 56 (6th ed. 1928).
6. Chase and Baker v. National Trust and Credit, 215 Fed. 633 (N. D. Ill.
1914); Security and Bond Deposits v. State, 105 Ohio St. 113, 136 N.E. 891 (1922):
Karp v. Harlem Business Protective Corp., 145 Misc. 280, 259 N. Y. Supp. 921
(Mun. Ct. 1932).
7. Banker's Savings and Loan v. Better Business Division of Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, 177 Ga. 334, 170 S.E. 291 (1933); State v. Comptoir National
D'Escompte De Paris, 51 La. Ann. 1272, 26 So. 91 (1899); State of Kansas v.
Hayes, 62 F. 2d 597 (C. C. A. 10th 1932); Hamilton Nat. Bank v. American Loan
and Trust, 66 Neb. 67 92 N.W. 189 (1902); Maclaren v. State, 141 Wis. 577, 124
N.W. 667 (1910); 1 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING 7 (6th ed. 1928).
8. Wedesweiler v. Brundage, 297 III. 228, 130 N.E. 520 (1921); Merrick v.
Home Stove and Foundry, 225 III. App. 362 (1st Dist. 1930); Rosenblum v. Anglim, 43 F. Supp. 889 (N. D. Calif. 1942). affd, 135 F. 2d 512 (C. C. A. 9th 1943).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss2/4

6

et al.: Recent Cases

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

said that engaging in transactions which might ordinarily be considered a part of
the banking business would not violate such a statute where such transactions
were incidental to or in aid of a non-banking enterprise.0
Over a period of years the scope of business done by banks has increased
greatly and now covers many types of transactions which were frequently carried
on solely by non-banking concerns. The Supreme Court of the United States pointed
out in the case of Oulton v. S~avings Institutiono that "Originally the business of
banking consisted only in receiving deposits, such as bullion, plate, and the like,
for safe-keeping until the depositor should see fit to draw it out for use, but the
business, in the progress of events, was extended, and bankers assumed to discount
bills and notes and to loan money upon mortgage, pawn, or other security, and at
a still later period to issue notes of their own intended as a circulating currency and
a medium of exchange instead of gold and silver." Present day banks also enter
into other various transactions in connection with carrying on their banking business. A bank may buy in timber land upon which it has loaned money and cut
and sell the timber, 1 enter into a partnership in a drug store in order to protect its
security,2 buy mining property to protect its investment,"3 and own stock in
another corporation for which it will be subject to the same liability as any other
stockholder.'1 It is apparent that the legislature did not intend that all corporations formerly engaged in commercial fields since entered into by banking corporations would be prohibited from legally continuing such transactions.
Missouri has wisely followed the prevailing rule in application of Section 7890
to the facts of this case. Currency Services did not receive money on deposit nor
did they make loans or discount notes. The only form of banking business in which
they engaged was that of selling their own personal checks. There was no danger
that depositors might lose their savings through mismanagement or that loans
might be made which would conflict with the laws of the state. The public possibly
would need protection from Currency Services withdrawing their funds from the
bank and thus rendering the checks valueless. However, adequate protection
seems to be provided by the bond required by the private banking institution for
overdrafts by Currency Services. This is not an ordinary form of banking business
and was not the type of transaction the legislature intended to limit to a corporation incorporated under the banking laws of the state.
9. Wells Fargo v. Northern Pac. Ry., 23 Fed. 469 (C. C. A. Ore. 1884)
(Express Co. transferring money by means of bills of exchange); Gimbel Bros. v.
White, 256 App. Div. 439, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 666 (3d Dep't 1939) (Department store
gave out coupons upon receiving money deposited with the store by the customers.
The coupons were redeemable in merchandise.)
10. 17 Wall. 109 (U. S. 1872).
11. John A. Roebling Sons' v. First Bank. 30 Fed. 744 (D. W. Va. 1885).
12. Snow Hill Banking and Trust v. J. D. Odom Drug, 188 N. C. 672, 125 S.E.
394 (1924).
13. Missouri State Bank v. South St. Louis Foundry, 145 Mo. App. 257, 129
S.W. 433 (1910).
14. National Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 628 (1878).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950
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After reaching the conclusion that the type of business Currency Services was
engaged in did not constitute the banking business within the meaning of the first
part of Section 7890 of Missouri Revised Statutes (1939), the court further held
that the latter part of the sectionis was unconstitutional and void because not
embraced in the title of the section,6 and because it was discriminatory and based
on an unreasonable and arbitrary classification.17
E. M. BROWN

CRIMINAL

LAW-FoRMER JEOPARDY

1
Holder v. Fraser

Petitioner was charged by separate informations with the involuntary manslaughter of three persons, caused by his driving a car in reckless, willful, and wanton disregard of the safety of others. After trial and conviction upon the first information, petitioner interposed a plea of former jeopardy to the other charges.
The lower court rejected the plea and the petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition
against the judge proceeding with the second trial. The Supreme Court of Arkansas
denied the writ on the ground that "when the crimes involve the element of intent,
we see no difficulty in finding two offenses in one act." The court says that the
willful negligence of the defendant is "equivalent to a conscious and deliberate disregard for the safety of others," and such conduct "borders so closely upon that
motivated by actual intent" that the same reasoning is applicable. Thus "petitioner
risked a violation of the statute as to each person whose life he imperiled and may
be held separately responsible for each death proximately resulting from the prohibited conduct."
15.

". ...

nor shall any such corporation, except an express company having

contracts with railroad compaines, or a transatlantic steamship company, or a telegraph company or telephone company, possess the power of receiving money check,
money power or otherwise."
16. "No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except bills enacted under the third exception in § 37 of this
article and general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects
and accounts for which moneys are appropriated." Mo. CONsT. Art. III, § 23

(1945); Ex parte Hunn, 357 Mo. 257, 207 S.W. 2d 468 (1948); State v. Smith,
353 Mo. 807, 184 S.W. 2d 593 (1945); Hunt v. Armour, 345 Mo. 677, 136 S.W. 2d
312 (1939); Fidelity Adj. Co. v. Cook, 399 Mo. 45, 95 S.W. 2d 1162 (1936); (The
last three of the above citations involve cases where the court construes Art. IV., §
27 of the Constitution of 1875. This section is the same as the section involved
here.)
17. "The general assembly shall not pass any local or special law ....

grant-

ing to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity, .... " Mo. CONST. Art. III, § (28) (1945); Ex parte French,
315 Mo. 75, 285 S.W. 513 (i1926); State v. Baskowitz, 250 Mo. 82, 156 S.W. 945
(1913); State v. Kimmel, 25 Mo. 611, 165 S.W. 1067 (1914). The court construes
Art. IV, § 53 (26) in the above cases. This section is the same as the one involved here.
L 219 S.W. 2d 625 (Ark. 1949).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss2/4
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A concurring opinion is based upon the definition of manslaughter as found
in the Arkansas statutes. 2 Justice McFaddin says that "the lawful killing of a human being

. .

. "means that a separate crime is committed every time any human

being is unlawfully killed, and that the statute "does not give a criminal a 'bargain
rate' on wholesale homicides."
The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and most of the state constitutions including Arkansas provide "that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb for the same offense." 3 The fear of persecution from despotic or
dictatorial governments and the manifest injustice of prosecuting a person more
than once for the same offense are the motivating factors for preserving such a
guarantee.4 The inconsistent application of the constitutional protection stems
from the lack of a uniform definition of the term "same offense."
Bishop says, "To give our constitutional provision the force evidently intended,
and to render it effectual, 'the same offense' must be interpreted as equivalent to
the same criminal act." 5
This so-called "single act" theory has been followed in Pennsylvania, New
York, 7 Texas," Alabama, 9 Indiana,1o Tennessee,"1 West Virginia,1 2 Iowa, 18 and
New Jersey,'14 at least. 15 Some proponents of this view have said, "it is the character of the act, not the results which flow from it, which determines the question of
guilt or innocence of the person who does the act."'i It is contended that for a
single act there can be but one criminal responsibility. Critics of this theory con2.

Pope's Digest § 2980,

3.

U. S. CoNsT. Art. II, § 8.

ARK. STATS.

§ 41-2207 (1947).

4. In the days of Magna Charta and the Common Law practically all offenses were felonies and the usual punishment was death. Thus the guarantee
against double jeopardy was of more vital significance than it would seem to be in
modem criminal law, where only a small percentage of the prosecutions call for
capital punishment or carry long prison terms. Another factor tending to show a
less urgent need for the provision is that jeopardy attached at common lav only
when a verdict was brought in, but in a majority of the American jurisdictions today it attaches when a valid indictment has been found, and a petit jury has been
impaneled and sworn, thus bringing technicalities into the use of the plea. Staundford P. C. 105-06; 4 BL. COMM. *335; 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 650 (5th ed. 1925);
Kirk, 'Jeopardy' During the Period of the Year Books, 82 U. of PA. L. REv. 602,
607, 612 (1934).
5. I BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW § 1060, p. 785 (9th ed. 1923).
6. Commonwealth v. McCord, 116 Pa. Super. 480, 176 Atl. 834 (1935).
7. People v. Barr, 259 N. Y. 104, 181 N.E. 64 (1932).
8. Jones v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. Rep. 355, 231 S.W. 122 (1921).
9. Hurst v. State, 24 Ala. App. 47, 129 So. 714 (1930); Gunter v. State, 111
Ala. 23, 20 So. 632 (1896).
10. Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420, 13 Am. Rep. 369 (1873).
11. Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W. 2d. 400 (1929).
12. State v. Houchins, 102 W. Va. 169, 134 S.E. 740 (1926).
13. State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933).
14. State v. Cosgrove, 103 N. J. L. 412, 135 Ad. 871 (1927).
15. 16 C. J. 283, § 485; 22 C. J. S. 452, § 298b.
16. State v. Rosa, 72 N. J. L. 462, 62 At. 695 (1905); Commonwealth v.
McCord, 116 Pa. Super. 480, 176 At. 834 (1935).
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tend that a physical act separated from the resulting consequences has no legal significance.17 For example, the act of flexing an arm is accomplished many times a
day without criminal liability, but if by the same kind of a muscular action intentional contact is made with another, who, because of that flexing, falls from a cliff
and is killed, there is criminal responsibility.
Some courts, which purport to use the "single act" test normally, seem to adopt
a test of "single result or consequence" when a person feloniously bums a building
destroying property and also injuring or destroying life. He may then be subjected
to two prosecutions. 18 Thus the "act"-striking the match-is of little significance.
Advocates of the "single act" test argue further that there is a difference between civil and criminal proceedings in that the state is the only one injured in a
case such as the principal one, and that there can be but one injury done to the
state by one act. 9 This analysis does not necessarily follow. The state has lost
three lives-three persons-who pay taxes and bear arms, and comprise its citizenship. The state should be allowed to protect itself against the loss of each life.
"Neither law nor public policy will justify a holding that each life is of less value
20
when taken with another than when taken alone."
2
An extension of the "single act" test is the so-called "same transaction" test. '
When in one violation of the peace several acts have occurred, courts are prone to
say it is but one transaction and only one crime. Thus where defendant had fired
a series of shots-one killing intentionally and one killing unintentionally-the Texas
court 22 said, "if a series of shots might be comtemplated as a single act or trans17. KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS 272 (1927), "The legal concept of an act
is the objective result of physical acts in a causal leading immediately to a legal
phenomenon (i.e., the creation, modification, or destruction, of a legal relation)."
18. People v. Grzesczak, 77 Misc. Rep. 202, 137 N. Y. Supp. 538 (Co. Ct.
1912); State v. Bobbitt, 228 Mo. 252, 128 S.W. 953 (1910). But see State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361 (1833).
19. Note, 20 HAmv. L. REv. 643 (1907); State v. Cosgrove, 103 N. J. L. 412,
135 At. 871 (1927); Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W. 2d 400 (1929); see
5 U. of Cm. L. REv. 140. But see State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353
(1937), saying, "There is no reason why the criminal rule should not be the same
as the civil rule of double liability. ... the wrong to an individual should not be
placed upon a higher plane than the same criminal act which gave rise to the civil
liability."
20. State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 3,53 (1937).
21. Hurst v. State, 86 Ala. 604, 6 So. 120 (1889); Haraway v. State, 22 Ala.
App. 553, 117 So. 612 (1928); Trawick v. Birmingham, 23 Ala. App. 308, 125 So.
211 (1929). Contra: McCrosky v. State, 17 Ala. App. 523, 87 So. 219 (1920).
Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 8 (1853); Ruffin v. State, 29 Ga. App. 214, 114 S.E. 581
(1922); Furnace v. State, 153 Ind. 93, 54 N.E. 441 (1899). Contra: Foran v.
State, 195 Ind. 55, 144 N.E. 529 (1924). People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 N.W.
1119 (1890); Crane v. State, 39 Okla. Cr. 40, 263 Pac. 174 (1928); Staples v. State,
76 Tex. Cr. Rep. 367, 175 S.W. 1056 (1915); Phillips v. State, 109 Tex. Cr. Rep.
523, 4 S.W. 2d 1056 (1928); Berwick v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. Rep. 322, 47 S.W. 2d
322 (1932); State v. Shedrick, 69 Vt. 428, 38 Atl. 75 (1897).
22. Spannell v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. Rep., 418, 203 S.W. 357, 359 (1918), "Where
two persons are killed or injured in one transaction, the fact that more than one
shot was fired does not, as a matter of law, render it insusceptible of proof that they
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action, a plea of former jeopardy will be sustained." Our author, in analyzing the
cases, has said that "if no human act or agency has separated the two offenses, they
are the same."23 The contradiction in this argument seems to be clear upon its
face since "two offenses" cannot possibly become the "same offense." They may be
similar or identical in that they violate the same statute but they are still two
separate offenses.
Still other courts hold that if a defendant's action is referrable to a "single
intent" he is answerable for only one offense. 24 Thus, State v. Wheelock, 25 cited but
not followed in the principal case, held, "there being no intent involved in the killing of three persons in an automobile accident in the sense of a deliberate desire
to bring about a certain result ....
there was but one crime stemming from a
single act and intent."
The "single intent" theory is difficult to apply because mens rea, specific intent, volition to act, and foreseeability of consequences are all used at different times
by the various courts as the proper definition of intent-a difficulty springing from
within the formula itself. The same criticism which was mentioned with regard to
the single act theory is applicable to the single intent test. An intent is without
legal significance until manifested by a prohibited consequence. 2 6 If this theory is
to be used, it seems we should limit liability solely to the number of intentions with
which a person acts, but we find where a single act and a single intent result in two
or more different prohibited results, two or more prosecutions are allowed because
27
there is no "identity of offense."
This leads to a fourth major theory-the "identity of offense" test. Those who
argue in favor of it say that the Fifth Amendment guarantees the defendant against
28
twice being placed in jeopardy for the identical offense and not for the act done.
were both killed by one act .... the issue of singleness of the act and intent bringing the double result has not been made to depend on the number of shots fired."
But see State v. Nash, 86 N. C. 650 (1882).
23. 30 GEo. L. J. 574 (1942); State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361 (1833).
24. Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W. 2d 400 (1929); State v. Corbett,
117 S. C. 356, 109 S.E. 133 (1921); State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361 (1833).
25.

216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933), "... . such difference [in the de-

cisions] arises nevertheless on the question of fact as to whether the intent of the
perpetrator was single or plural."
26. See note 17, supra.
27. Offenses must be the same in law and fact: People v. Helbing, 61 Cal.
620 (1882); Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 496 (Mass. 1832); State v. Magone,
33 Ore. 570, 56 Pac. 648 (1899); or the crimes must be identical: People v. Majors,
65 Cal. 138, 3 Pac. 597 (1884); People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88
(1925); Taylor v. State, 110 Ga. 150, 35 S.E. 161 (1900); Smith v. Commonwealth,
17 Ky. L. 541, 32 S.W. 137 (1895); Commonwealth v. Browning, 146 Ky. 770, 143
S.W. 407 (1912); Slone v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 366, 99 S.W. 2d 207 (1936);
State v. Dills, 210 N. C. 178, 185 S.E. 677 (1936); Winn v. State, 82 Wis. 571, 52
N.W. 775 (1892).
28. "It is the identity of the offense, and not of the act which is referred to
in the constitutional guaranty . . . . Layman and lawyer alike understand the
word 'offense' to here mean simply a crime . . . . The words 'same offense' mean

same offense, not the same transaction, not the same acts, not the same circum-
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One cannot logically argue with this position because it is but a restatement of the
problem. "Identical offense" is "same offense," but they do say that "offense" merely
means "crime" and in a multiple killing "each killing is a separate crime,1 29 and that
by proving A killed B, you are not proving that A killed C.30
Once again, it is not the proposition in the abstract which greatly troubles one,
but its application to a given situation. The "test" would seem to be a reiteration
of the basic problem, substituting "identity of offense" for "same offense" and it is
impossible, without more, to determine the solution.
Realizing that in itself the "identity of offense" test is no test at all, courts have
attempted to bring forth working rules to apply to the various sets of facts that
confront them. Variations of the so-called "same evidence" test are promulgated to
do the task. The earliest of these rules was set out by Buller in Rex v. Vandercomb
and Abbott.3' (Acquittal of breaking and entering a dwelling and stealing is no bar
to subsequent prosecution for breaking and entering the same dwelling at the same
time with the intent to steal.) There the court said, "that unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might have been convicted upon by proof of the
facts contained in the second indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment can
be no bar to the second."
A reversal of this rule is contended for by some courts, in that a former trial
will not be a bar to a subsequent prosecution unless the defendant could have been
convicted to the offense charged in the subsequent trial on the evidence offered in
32
the former.
A still broader variation used is that jeopardy upon one indictment is no bar
to jeopardy upon a subsequent indictment unless the evidence required to support
a conviction upon either of them would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction
33
upon the other.
And a final approach used in People v. Brannon,34 says, "The true test is,....
could the defendant have been convicted upon the first indictment upon proof of the
facts, not as brought forward in evidence, but as alleged in the record .... "
Because of the evidence approach to the problem the issue of former jeopardy
may often turn upon the accidental inclusion or superfluous allegations in an information or indictment. 33 Many say since a second indictment, such as in the prinstances or same situation." State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, 106 N.E. 50 (1914);
People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1925).
29. State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937); see 113 A. L. R.
222 (1938).
30. See Note, 18 ORE. L. REv. 36, 39 (1938); Commonwealth v. Roby, 12
Pick. 496 (Mass. 1832); Winn v. State, 82 Wis. 571, 52 N.W. 775 (1892).
31. 2 Leach C.C. 708 (1796).
32. See State v .Brownrigg, 87 Me. 500, 33 Atl. 11 (1895); Ex Parte Gano,
90 Kans. 134, 132 Pac. 999 (1913); WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw § 394 (12th ed.

1932).
33. State v. Waterman, 87 Iowa 255, 54 N.W. 359 (1893); Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871); Note, 12 CORN. L. Q. 212 (1927).
34. 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 tFac. 88 (1925).
35. Comment, 40 YALE L. J. 462, 463 (1931).
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cipal case, has done nothing more than change the name of the deceased that the
second trial is upon the essential facts of the former hearing and thus double jeopardy.A6 This, of course, is but a reversion to the "single act" theory under which
the defendant contends that a jury has made a finding upon the question of fact as
to whether or not he had driven recklessly and to prosecute him again on that fact
would be double jeopardy.
"Although the mere proof of an acquittal of an offense containing an element
essential to the guilt of an offense charged in a later indictment will not necessarily
result in barring the second prosecution on grounds of res judicata [or former
jeopardy], it is clear that where it can be proved to the satisfaction of the court
that the prior acquittal was based upon a finding in favor of the defendant as to
this factual element such a finding is conclusive in the subsequent prosecution.""7
It would seem that once more we have reverted to the "single act" theory or "single
intent" approach though purporting to deny their validity.
Perhaps the most forthright approach to the so-called "identity of offense"
problem is that used by the concurring Justice in the principal case-to read and
interpret the statute under which the defendant is being prosecuted. The virtue of
looking to the statute needs no comment. Since the statute defines manslaughter
as the "unlawful killing of a human being .

.

.." he interprets it to require the use

of the consequences of an illegal act as the basis for determining liability-thus the
conclusion that "each killing is a separate violation of the statute.".
An analysis of the decisions seems to indicate that no matter which test is
being applied there are other factors which influence the final result though they
are not mentioned in the opinions. The basic question does not seem to be, "How
many offenses are there?", but rather, "How much punishment should we inflict
upon this defendant?" This is demonstrated quite conclusively by the decisions of
the Texas courts. When there has been an acquittal, their test seems to be the
"same transaction" test plus a showing that under the first indictment the defendant
might have been convicted upon proof of the facts contained in the second indictment, while the case of a plea of former conviction the "same transaction test only"
is used. 5
36. Cooper v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 909, 51 S.W. 789 (1899), 59 S.W.
524 (1900); Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436, 6 Sup. Ct. 437 (1886); 2 VAN
FLEET, FoRMER ADJUDICATION p. 1242, § 628 (1895); "Where an essential element

of the offense denounced in the indictment has once been passed upon favorably
to the defendant by a jury, in the trial between the state and the defendant, this
decision is final and conclusive between the parties, and will support a plea of former
jeopardy as against a trial on some other charge growing out of the same transaction; and said original judgment is conclusive in favor of such person on the subsequent trial." Spannell v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. Rep., 418, 203 'S.W. 357 (1918).
37. Comment, 40 YALE L. J. 462, 466 (1931).
38. Irvin v. State, 7 Tex. App. 78 (1879); Simco v. State, 9 Tex. App. 338
(1880); Wright v. State, 17 Tex. App. 152 (1884); Shubert v. State, 21 Tex. App.
551, 2 S.W. 883 (1886); Augustine v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. Rep., 59, 52 S.W. 77 (1899);
Plunk v. State, 96 Tex. Cr. Rep., 205, 256 S.W. 922 (1923); Gates v. State, 100
Tex. Cr. Rep., 36, 271 S.W. 632 (1925). Contra: Thompson v. State, 90 Tex. Cr.
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Inevitably there is the unmentioned conflict of the legal consequences with the
moral standards which society in general holds. It is much easier to say that a person who hits one man who in turn falls into another, injuring both, has only committed one crime of assault than .to say that there has been but one crime of murder when a single shot kills two people. The severity of the consequences seems
to influence the courts in their conclusion as to when jeopardy has attached.
FRED KLING
CRIMINAL

LAw-VIOLATION

OF MUNICIPAL

PARKING

ORDINANCE-PRESUMPTION

ACT WAS COMMITTED BY OWNER
City of St. Louis v. Cook"
In the principal case, the Supreme Court of Missouri was called upon to examine the validity of Ordinance No. 41240 of the City of St. Louis, which provides:
The presence of any vehicle in or upon any public street ....
in violation
of any ordinance regulating the parking of such vehicle . . . . shall by
prima facie evidence that the person . . .. in whose name such vehicle is
registered . . . committed or authorized such violation.

Another ordinance of that city prohibited parking between a safety zone and the
adjacent curb. 2 Defendant, Cook, was charged with violation of the latter ordinance. On appeal, his case was tried in the court of criminal correction. There it
appeared that an automobile bearing Cook's license plates was found parked in a
prohibited zone. A ticket was left on the automobile. Upon failure to pay the fine
within the time allowed, a summons was issued for his arrest. The city introduced
no other evidence that tended to show the identity of the person who had parked
the car in the prohibited zone. Cook introduced no evidence at all. Cook upon conviction appealed to the supreme court contending that the ordinance was unconsti-.
tutional in that it violated the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions;3 that it forced him to testify against himself in a criminal action; 4 that it
violated the fundamental principle that a defendant is presumed innocent until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and that he could not be prejudiced by
his failure to testify. There were other contentions but the court apparently disregarded them.
The court held that the ordinance was valid and that it denied to appellant
none of his constitutional rights. The power to make rules of the road and traffic
regulations is expressly given to the city.5 With the delegation of authority to the
Rep., 222, 234 S.W. 400 (1921); cf. Fenton v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. Rep., 633, 28 S.W.
537 (1894).
1. 221 S.W. 2d 468 (Mo. 1949).
2. REv. CODE Or ST. Louis § 3568 (1936).
3. U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1; Mo. CONST. Art. I, § 10.
4. Mo. CONST. Art. I, § 19.
5. Mo. REV. STAT. § 8395 (1939), as amended by Mo. Laws 1943, pp. 659-
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city goes the power to provide for and make rules of evidence. This power is
limited only by the rule that the "fact upon which the presumption or inference is
to rest must have some relation to or natural connection with the fact to be inferred,
and that the inference of the existence of the fact be inferred from the existence
of the fact proved must not be purely arbitrary or wholly unreasonably, unnatural,
or extraordinary," and such presumption may not be made conclusive.
The court examines the practical aspects and the purpose of the ordinance.
The knowledge, peculiarly with the owner, as to who is operating his vehicle places
upon the owner the burden of explaining the circumstances under which his car was
"tagged," and this burden the court finds places no great inconvenience or hard.
ship on the defendant. The court also finds that the defendant was not forced to
testify against himself. 7
The court's opinion seems to be in accord with the weight of authority and
the general trend of opinion in the courts throughout the United States. There is
no disagreement that the legislature has the power to create presumptions under
its general power to control the rules of procedure and, in so doing, change the
rules of evidence. How far the legislature should be allowed to go is the basis of dis-

sension.
In dealing with presumptions in criminal cases, the courts are faced with a
serious problem. They have for determination before them the guilt or innocence
of a member of a society which attaches such great odiousness to a conviction that
the defendant is clothed with a presumption of innocence. The prosecution is required to convince the jury that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It
is plain, therefore, that, unless the legislature's creature, the presumption, is a solid
and reasonable one, grave dangers may threaten this presumption of innocence.
The test to be applied to the validity of such presumptions is therefore an
important one. In the recent cases of Tot v. United States and United States v.
Delia,8 which were considered together, the court laid down the rule as follows:
"Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if
there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience.
This is not to say a valid presumption may not be created upon a view of
6. Quoting from Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 32
L. R. A., N.S. 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463, the court said, "Legislation providing that
proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue is
but to enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general power of government.
Statutes, national and state, dealing with such methods of proof in both civil and
criminal cases, abound, and the decisions upholding them are numerous." 221 S.W.
2d at 470.
7. The court here relies upon the case of Yee Hem v. U. S., 268 U. S. 178
(1925), where the Court pointed out that the position in which the defendant
finds himself because of the presumption might well have arisen had such facts
actually been proved, and the constraint upon the defendant to testify would have
been just as great as it is because of the presumption. 221 S.W. 2d at 470.
8. 319 U. S. 463, reversing 131 F. 2d 261 (C. C. A. 3d 1942) and afflrming
42 F. Supp. 252, (D. C. 1941).
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relation broader than that a jury might take in a specific case. But where
the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not contempt for the legislature
to create it as a rule governing the procedure of the courts."9
Opposed to this test is the view of Dean Wigmore. It is his opinion that when the
legislature says such and such shall raise a presumption, the determination of the
validity of such a presumption should not be subject to a judicial standard of rationality, for the legislature is not bound by the rules of logic. All the legislature
is doing, he says, is to render a fact admissable that was before inadmissable, or to
place the burden of producing evidence on the other party.'0 It is submitted, however, that the requirement of rationality is a needed safeguard, particularly in criminal cases."1
Besides the test of rationality, another one has been used rather widely. This
is the "comparative convenience" test. There is some dispute as to whether this
is an alternative to the reasonable relation test discussed above or a corollary to it.
This rule of comparative convenience is used to justify a presumption where the
defendant has easier access to the proof than the prosecution and where requiring
the defendant to go forward with the proof would not subject him to unfairness or
hardship. Both the better access of defendant to proof and the fairness of shifting
the burden to him must be present. This so-called "pragmatic test" has been criticized.12 In the Tot case,' 3 the court said that it must be applied with caution. The
9. Id at 467. The Missouri Supreme Court has stated a rule as follows:
. in our opinion a statutory rule evidentially is no stronger than a similar
judicial rule; and cannot authorize the imposition of a liability or penalty, civil or
criminal through the device of declaring certain facts shall be prima facie evidence
of another decisive or incriminating fact-:-when the rule is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable, lacking in logic connection between the initial and imputed facts, and has
been met by substantial controverting evidence." Kellogg v. Murphy, 349 Mo. 1165,
1180, 164 S.W. 2d 285, 294 (1942).
10. 4

WIGMORE,

EvIDENcE § 1356, pp. 703 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).

11. In answer to Wigmore, see opinion of Streissguth, J., in State v. Kelly,
218 Minn. 247, 15 N.W. 2d 554, 162 A. L. R. 477 (1944). See also Brosman, The
Statutory Presumption,5 TULANE L. REv. 17, 178, at 187 (1931).
12. "As applied to the question under discussion, the pragmatic test might
be stated as follows: 'What social evil do most of the people desire to eradicate?
Everything not immediately harmful in itself to society and tending to stamp out
that evil is reasonable?' It naturally, although not necessarily, follows that those
who use this test focus more on the object in view than the means applied to its
accomplishment. Truth is based on desires rather than on facts and reason. The
current history of many European nations has proven that such a procedure, if carried to its logical conclusions is charged with insurmountable danger to personal
liberty." O'Toole, Artificial Preswmptions in the Criminal Law, 11 ST. JOnN's L.

REv. 167, 171-172 (1937). Professor O'Toole's conclusion is that in order for an
artificial presumption in a criminal case to be valid: (1) The fact out of which the
inference flows must be relevant to the crime charged; (2) the fact out of which
the presumption flows should constitute an ingredient of the crime charged; and
(3) the fact out of which the presumption flows should be one which experience has
demonstrated to be closely connected with the establishment of the crime as distinguished from evidence of the crime. Id. at 187.
13. See note 7, supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss2/4
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fact alone that defendant's knowledge of the facts might be superior to that of the
prosecution would not be sufficient justification for the creation of a presumption.
The inference must first be one that has a reasonable relation.
In any event, the presumption created by Ordinance No. 41240 would seem
valid. The police find a car bearing a license plate issued to X parked in a no-parknig zone. From proof that 1) the car was illegally parked and 2) that the license
on the car was issued to X, we are to infer that X parked it there. Certainly there
is a rational connection between the ownership of the automobile and its operation.
For common experience tells us that the owner, or a member of his family, or a
person authorized by him to drive the vehicle is usually the operator of his vehicle.
As a general rule, people do not drive someone else's car and, when they do, it is
with the permission of the owner. If the owner did not commit or authorize the
violation, he has it within his power to rebut the presumption.
The application of the reasoning used here, however, to more serious criminal
offenses could lead to undesirable results. Crime is said generally to have two basic
elements, act and intent. Intent may be safely gathered from the act, for people
generally do not do what they do not intend to do. And in minor crimes intent may
be dispensed with. But the ordinance in question infers not only intent but the act.
There is no duty on the city to show who parked the vehicle there or, in short, who
committed the act that is punishable. In the factual situation of the present case,
the punishment, a five dollar fine, is not serious and the connection between the
owner and the driver of an automobile is reasonable. Presumptions such as the one
present here, however, make possible punishment where the defendant may have
committed no act at all. For this reason, the courts should examine closely the effect of applying such presumptions in criminal cases.
Although the general standard for determining validity of the statutory presumption would have been the same, the court could have treated the principal case
as a civil, rather than a criminal case. There are many decisions in Missouri which
state that proceedings to punish for violation of a city ordinance are civil in na5
ture.14 The court in its opinion cites two cases, City of Stanberry v. O'Neal"
and
16
City of Clayton v. Nemours, which reflect this view. It is said that, by definition,
proceedings to punish for violation of a city ordinance cannot be considered criminal.17 This reasoning has been used in holding that, although the procedure is sim14. See Mo. DIGEST, Key No. 635-Municipal Corporations.
15. 166 Mo. App. 709, 150 S.W. 1104 (1912).
16. 353 Mo. 61, 182 S.W. 2d 57 (1944), which refers to the decision of the
court of appeals in an earlier appeal of the case wherein this specific point was more
fully discussed. See note 17, infra.
17. "vVhere the punishment prescribed by the ordinance may, in the first
instance, be the imprisonment of the defendant, the conception of the action as one
for the recovery of a debt will of course no longer obtain (City of St. Louis v. Van
Hoffman, 312 Mo. 600, 280 S.W. 421), but even so the preceeding, though its sole
object is to punish, is nevertheless not a proceeding to punish for the commission of
a crime in the accurate legal sense of the term. This is for the reason that crime is
an act committed in violation of public law, that is, a law coextensive with the
boundaries of the state which enacts it, while an ordinance, on the contrary, is no
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950
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lar to that in criminal cases,' 8 either party may appeal a case involving violation
of an ordinance,' 9 and that conviction for violation of an ordinance is no bar to a
20
prosecution under state law for the same act.
GEORGE W. WINGER

TAXATIoN-REAL ESTATE-TIME WHEN TAx LIEN ArAcHEs
United States v. CertainLand Situate in City
St. Louis, Missouri,
In comdemnation proceedings by the United States against certain land situated in St. Louis, Missouri, the Collector of Revenue of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, intervened as defendant and sought to collect state, school and city taxes for
the year 1946 out of money paid into the registry of the court by the United States.
A declaration of taking by the United States was filed on January 16, 1946, and the
court entered judgment on the same day. At this time the tax assessment for
the city and schools had not been established.
When the United States appropriates land under eminent domain, the lien for
taxes cannot thereafter be enforced against the land, but the condemnation proceeding transfers the lien from the land to the award in the registry of the court.2
Therefore, it was necessary for the court to determine the date upon which the tax
lien attached to the land so as to determine whether or not the amount of taxes
was due from the award in the registry. This case presents for the first time since
the adoption of the Missouri Constitution of 1945 and the enabling statutes thereunder the question as to when the lien for state, city and school taxes attaches
to realty and whether or not such taxes can be apportioned. Harper, District
Judge, held that under the law of Missouri, a person holding property on the first
day of January is liable for the taxes thereon for the whole of that calendar year;
that an "inchoate lien" attaches as of the first day of January which lien shall "accrue and become a fixed encumbrance" as soon as the amount of the taxes is established; that such fixed lien relates back to the first day of January; and that
where the land is taken by the United States, thereby becoming tax exempt, the

more than a mere local police regulation passed in pursuance of and in subordination
to the general or public law for the preservation of peace and the promotion of
good order in a particular locality." City of Clayton v. Nemours, 164 S.W. 2d 935,
938 (Mo. App. 1942). Cf. the disserting opinion in City of Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo.
588, 590 (1878).
18. Mo. REv. STAT. § 7140, 7363 (1939).
19. City of Clayton v. Nemours, supra note 17; City of Kansas v. Clark, 68
Mo. 588 (1878).
20. State v. Jackson, 220 S.W. 2d 779 (Mo. App. 1949); cf. the dissenting
opinion in City of Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588, 590 (1878).
1. 86 F. Supp. 297 (E. D. Mo. 1949).
2. Collector of Revenue within and for the City of St. Louis, Mo. v. Ford
Motor Co., 158 F. 2d 354 (C. C. A. 8th 1946).
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taxes cannot be apportioned so as to make the original owner liable for the taxes

for only that portion of the year during which he was the owner.
This decision is in agreement with Missouri cases arising before the passage

of the Missouri Constitution of 1945 and the enabling statutes enacted thereunder.
The cases decided under the law of this state prior to the adoption of the 1945

Constitution are collected and fully discussed by William E. Aulgar in 12 Missouri
Law Review, 228 (1947), the reasons and justification for the decisions in those
cases being set out therein by Mr. Aulgur. Therefore, the purpose here is to make a
comparative study of the statutes under which those cases were decided and the
statutes under which the principal case was decided.
The present tax lien statute of Missouri provides: "Government lands entered
or located on prior to the first day of January shall be taxable for that year and
every year thereafter; school and swamp land and lots shall become whenever the
county sells, conveys or agrees to convey its title; real property shall in all cases be
liable for the taxes thereon, and a lien is hereby vested in favor of the state in all
real property for all taxes thereon, which lien shall accrue and become a fixed encumbrance as soon as the amount of the taxes is determined by assessment and
levy, and said lien shall be enforced as hereafter provided in this chapter; said lien

shall continue to be enforced until all taxes, forfeitures, back taxes and costs shall
be fully paid or the land sold or released as provided in this chapter."3 The prior
lien statute of Missouri 4 differed from the present statute in that it contained the

date of the first day of June instead of the first day of January and did not contain
the clause, ". . . which lien shall accrue and become a fixed encumbrance as soon
as the amount of the taxes is determined by assessment and levy ... ." The change
in date was made necessary by the constitutional provision that taxes assessed for
one year are payable during that same calendar or fiscal yearr, but this change in
date does not change the substance of the statute. The question involved is, does
the above clause change the time that the tax lien attaches to the realty? That is,
does the tax lien attach as of the assessment date as it did under the prior statute, or
does it attach at the time the amount of the taxes is determined by assessment
and levy? The defendant Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Company contended in the principal case that this clause interpreted in the light of McAvally v.
Little River Drainage District6 has the effect of changing the date of attachment
of the tax lien from the initial date of the assessment to the date of completion
of the assessment and levy of the tax. In the McNally case, Judge Gantt stated
by way of dictum 7 that the lien for taxes was established by an assessment, adding:
"However, said lien does not accrue and become a fixed encumbrance until the
amount of the tax is determined by an annual assessment of the land and annual
3. Mo. Laws 1945, § 7, pp. 1800-1801; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10942.6 (Supp.
1949).
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 10941 (1939).
5. Mo. CONsT. Art. X. § 3.
6. 325 Mo. 348, 28 S.W. 2d 6$0 (1930).
7. Id. at 354, 28 S.W. 2d at 651 (1930).
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levy of the tax." Were this statement interpreted as contended for by the defendant
Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Company it would have the effect of attaching the tax lien to the land as of the date the tax was determined and levied under
the prior Missouri lien statute. Were that the rule under the prior statute, the
present statute certainly would have the same effect since the statute contains
words very similar to those of Judge Gantt. But it is this author's opinion that no
such interpretation can be placed on the statement. Immediately preceding the
quoted statement in the McAnally case is the statement that the tax lien is established by the assessment, and the quoted statement is qualified by the word
"however." The qualification indicates that an inchoate lien attached to the land
as of the assessment date such lien becoming a fixed encumbrance upon the completion of the assessment and levy. This interpretation is even more apparent because, as pointed out in the principal case, Judge Gantt held in State, ex rel. Waddell, Revenue Collector v. Johnsoii that the tax lien attached as of the initial assessment date. Were the interpretation contended for by defendant applied to the
McAnally case, it would be contrary to the above holding. Therefore, since Judge
Gantt apparently used the words "accrue" and "fixed encumbrance" to mean the
opposite of inchoate, it is logical that the legislature may also have so used them.
"Accrue," as used in the statute, could mean either that the lien comes into being
upon the amount of the taxes being determined and leveid, no lien being in existence
prior to that time, or that the lien is in existence -prior to determination and levy
of the amount of the taxes, but that the extent of such lien cannot be established
until the amount of the taxes is determined and levied. 9 The phrase "become a
fixed encumbrance" could indicate something in being which becomes settled, immovable, or definite, or it could indicate the coming into existence of the encumbrance. Therefore all of the tax statutes must be considered in an effort to determine what interpretation is to be placed upon the lien statute. The lien statute
concerning the persons liable for taxes'0 would seem to indicate that there is a lien
attaching to the land as of the initial assessment date, since the latter statute states
that all persons owning real property on the first day of January are liable for the
taxes thereon for that calendar year. This lien Judge Harper terms an "inchoate'
lien and construes the words "accrue!' and "fixed" to mean the opposite of inchoate.
To construe the clause otherwise would be in conflict with the statute concerning
the persons liable for taxes and would leave the government with an uncollectable
tax in the event that the owner of realty sold the property to the United States
after the first day of January but before the tax rate was finally determined and
levied, since the only way the government can collect delinquent land taxes is to
enforce its lien. 1 Therefore, the original owner would enjoy all of the benefits of the
land tax free for that portion of the year during which he was the owner.
8.
9.
10.
1949).
11.

316 Mo. 21, 296 S.W. 806 (1927).
1 C. J.S. p. 759.
Mo. Laws 1945, § 4, p. 1800; Mo. REv.

STAT. ANN.

§ 10942.3 (Supp.

State ex rel. Hayes v. Snyder, 139 Mo. 549, 41 S.W. 216 (1897); and Mo.
11175 (1939).

REv. STAT. §
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Also to be considered in connection with 'these. statutes are three other statutes.
The assessment statutes 2 provide that the assessment is to begin on the first day
of, January. The, statute prescribing the form of the oath or affirmation to be made
by the person filing a- tax list contains in that form a statement that the list is a
true list of il1taxable real or tangible personal property owned by that person "on
the first day of January." 13 The assessor, except in the City of St. Louis, is to
make an affidavit when he returns the assessor's books to the county court. The
statute' 4 sets forth the form of the affidavit in which the assessor verifies that
the book contains the taxable property situate in the county "on the first day of
January last past." From these statutes, it is apparent that the tax assessment
is to.be-made as of the first day of January. Since the assessment is to be, as of the
first day of January, it is logical that the tax lien should attach as of that date.
As pointed out in the principal case and by Mr. Aulgur, 15 the courts of Missouri
have always treated the lien for taxes as arising from the assessment statutes and
not from the statutes expressly providing for the lien.
-As to the apportionment of the taxes, the present Missouri tax statute provides: "Every person owning or holding real property or tangible personal property
on the first day of January including all such property purchased on that day, shall
be liable for taxes thereon during the same calendar year."' ,, There is no difference
between this statute and the prior corresponding statute 7 as concerning the liability
of the owner of realty for taxes thereon. Under the prior statute, it was held in
State, ex rel. Hayes v. SnyderB that the person holding the property on the assessment date was liable for the taxes thereon. Thus it would seem from this statute that the only one liable for taxes for the whole year is the one who owns the
land on the initial assessment date and that apportionment of the taxes between
that owner and a subsequent owner would not be permissible. It was held in
McLaren. v. Sheble' 9 that the realty tax was based on ownership of the land on
the initial assessment date and not on continued ownership.
The principal case was heard .in a Federal District Court and is not binding
on the Supreme Court of Missouri. But the interpretation of the Missouri tax
laws in this case appears to be the most logical construction, and it is very probable
that the decision will be followed by the courts of this state.
The interpretation given the Missouri statutes in the principal case would ap12. Mo.' Laws 1945, § 7, p. 1861 and § 10, p. 1785; Mo. 'REV.
§ § 11000.107 and 11000.9 (Supp. 1949).
13.

STAT. ANN.

Mo. Laws 1945 § 17 pp. 1787-1788; Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11000.16

(Supp/ 1949).
14.

Mo. Laws 1945,, § 39, p. 1796; Mo. REV.

STAT.- ANN.

§ 11000W8 (Supp.

1949).
15. 12 Mo. L. REV. 228 (1947).
16. Mo. Laws 1945, § 4, p. 1800; Mo. REV. STAT. ANN, 10942.3 (Supp. 1949).
17. Mo. REv. STAT. §-10940 (1939).
18. 139 Mo. 549, 41 S.W. 216 (1897): decided under Mo. REV. STAT. § 7569
(1889) which is the same as Mo. REV. STAT. § 10940 (1939).
19. 45 Mo. 130 (1869).
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pear to make a vendor of realty liable on his covenants against encumbrance to the
vendee for unpaid taxes for the year during which-the land is sold. This is in the absence of an express exception of the taxes from the covenants against encumbrances.
BRUCE A. RING
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